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Introduction 
CONSTRUCTING BLACK POWER 
David Goldberg and Trevor Griffey 
The construction industry has provided extraordinary opportunities for class 
mobility in the United States, but those benefits have been largely restricted to 
white men and their families. After World War II, home ownership became, 
along with Social Security, one of the few entitlements that the political culture 
of the Cold War allowed to be considered "American." From the 1940s through 
the 1960s, generous federal government home-loan programs, highway con-
struction, and tax incentives heavily underwrote residential construction in the 
United States (particularly in its suburbs). As numerous studies have shown, the 
racial exclusivity of the post-World War II federal subsidies for home ownership, 
combined with the lack of fair housing laws, ensured that the unprecedented 
class mobility afforded to Americans in the postwar era disproportionately ben-
efited white families. The resulting disparate levels of wealth accumulation from 
the 1940s to the 1960s ensured that, as the middle class expanded, it remained 
predominantly white and suburban.1 
But the question of who owned homes or benefited from real estate specula-
tion does not fully explain the role that the construction industry has had in shap-
ing U.S. society. The growth of U.S. homeownership after World War II provided 
jobs that allowed millions of blue-collar workers and their families to partici-
pate in a new consumer society. Building trades unions facilitated this transition 
while restricting access to it. Construction industry unionization was at its apex 
in 1940-1960, when half of all construction jobs were union and unions con-
trolled the industry in many cities outside the South. The fact that this was also 
a time when federal government construction spending was at its apex is hardly 
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a coincidence. Federal law, and many similar state laws, required that government 
contractors pay the "prevailing wage," which in turn provided unions extraordi-
nary leverage to organize the construction industry. These organizing campaigns 
did more than ensure that construction workers received a fair portion of the 
profits from the construction industry boom. They also wrested away employer 
prerogatives to train, hire, fire, and discipline workers from contractors. As a re-
sult, building trades unions exerted extraordinary power to control wages and 
worker access to an industry that during the post-war boom provided close to 
10 percent of male employment.2 
Thus, although the construction industry literally paved the way for the 
emergence of a postwar service-based economy, black workers remained largely 
trapped in industrial jobs that provided lower wages and few, if any, opportuni-
ties to ascend the ranks into management. The "racial welfare state" of the New 
Deal—which subsidized racially segregated homeownership and discriminatory 
employers and granted labor rights to racially exclusive unions—deepened racial 
segregation by limiting economic and social mobility to white men, thus produc-
ing "a mostly white and propertied proletariat in the suburbs, and a poor, inner 
city working class of people of color."3 Black unemployment increased rather 
than decreased, even during the heyday of the postwar boom, because of the seg-
regation of blacks into low and semiskilled jobs and inner-city neighborhoods 
made vulnerable to layoffs produced by automation, the relocation of factories 
to the suburbs, and deindustrialization.4 
It was in this context that black activists in Philadelphia, frustrated with the 
glacial pace of post-World War II racial liberalism and the gradualist politics 
of the established civil rights leaders, built a largely working-class, grassroots 
movement incorporating the politics of disruption and direct action to con-
front institutionalized racism in the construction industry. Incorporating ide-
ological and tactical approaches as well and constituents from nationalist and 
community-based activism and boycotts of the 1950s, "Philadelphia's branches 
of CORE and the NAACP" in April 1963 began a two-month series of protests 
and construction shutdowns to demand "the inclusion of black workers in city-
sponsored construction projects." These protests brought mass direct-action 
tactics to large-scale, publicly funded construction projects in the North. In the 
process, they "attacked the very core of postwar Keynesian economics: business 
and unions reliant on government spending" and fundamentally transformed 
the northern freedom movement.5 
The 1963 Philadelphia protests helped launch a six-year, nationwide move-
ment for "affirmative action from below" that became rooted in Black Power 
and community control politics. Construction protests spread to other job sites 
in the northeast during the summer, including the Downstate Medical Center in 
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Brooklyn and the Barringer School in Newark, campaigns chronicled in this vol-
ume. Throughout the summer, activists, many of them associated with the Con-
gress of Racial Equality (CORE), became "impatient with the pace of change" and 
experimented "with new, more militant forms of protest."6 According to Elliot 
Rudwick and August Meier, the 1963 protests precipitated a series of "changes 
that involved not only a stress on the grievances of the black poor, but also an 
escalation of tactics, the beginning of an erosion in the commitment to nonvio-
lence, and a tendency towards black separatism." What emerged in their wake 
was a movement of local movements that frequently blurred the lines between 
civil rights and black power while also placing the two in increasing tension with 
one another.7 
Although they are connected with much longer struggles for jobs and jus-
tice and community-centered labor organizing, the 1963 protests and those that 
followed do not fit neatly within a history of the "long civil rights movement." 
The expulsion of black radical labor organizations and leaders from the labor 
movement during the Red Scare created a generational vacuum between the 
1940s- and 1950s-era black radicals and 1960s activists. Cold War unionism, 
dominated by the building trades unions, further limited the options available 
to the civil rights leaders and unionists who remained. Internal efforts to reform 
the building trades unions through voluntarism, liberal-labor coalitions, or re-
maining race-based caucuses such as the Negro American Labor Council proved 
futile, and racially progressive allies within the labor movement were scarce and 
enfeebled. 
The 1963 building trades protests were central to the "Negro Revolt of 1963" 
and represented the limits of civil rights unionism and fair employment politics. 
Activists organized outside the formal labor movement to demand "that racial 
equality in construction" and local jobs for local people "be measured by results" 
rather than procedure.8 When these demands were not met and federally funded 
urban renewal projects continued, activists, including mainline civil rights or-
ganizations, increasingly turned to Black Power labor politics and community 
control organizing to gain access to jobs as well as control of the economic and 
physical development of inner cities.9 
As the contributors to this book show, confrontations with the building trades 
unions became a critical axis for the rise of Black Power and community con-
trol politics, and provide a means for us to rethink the history of Black Power 
through the fusion by the movement of community control and labor organiz-
ing. By tracing the evolution of these activists' organizing methods and analysis, 
we show that African American grassroots struggles to desegregate the construc-
tion industry provided a major, and in some cities the, means through which 
Black Power movements became ascendant in African American urban politics. 
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Only through close attention to local politics are these profound cultural and 
political shifts visible. Because of their decentralized quality, the movements for 
community control of the construction industry varied by city, based on the id-
iosyncratic nature of the specific African American communities and political 
networks from which they emerged. These differences were accentuated by weak 
federal enforcement of affirmative action plans, which relied on a strategy of 
localism that placed the origin, evolution, and fate of construction industry af-
firmative action plans primarily in the hands of local actors and courts.10 
The chapters in this book thus provide case studies whose sum is greater than 
their parts. Their focus on local politics contribute to a growing body of litera-
ture focusing on expanding our understanding of civil rights histories beyond 
charismatic leaders to understand how local people's participation in the black 
freedom movement drove much of its intellectual and political evolution. Our 
regional focus on the urban North stems from the fact that campaigns to deseg-
regate the construction industry did not enter the South until the early 1970s, 
and emerged largely in response to federal government intervention.11 Inspired 
by the southern civil rights activism, the campaigns to desegregate the building 
trades galvanized local movements in the North in ways that voting registration 
and direct action campaigns against public segregation politicized local people 
in the South.12 
The ascension of community control and Black Power perspectives within 
local movements to desegregate the building trades during the early and mid-
1960s are chronicled at length in the first three chapters of this book, which pres-
ent case studies of Brooklyn, Newark, and the San Francisco Bay Area. Chapters 4 
and 5, studies of Detroit and Chicago, continue this approach, but chronicle the 
development and activities of the Black Power construction coalitions formed in 
wake of spreading urban uprisings, whose campaigns facilitated the implemen-
tation of affirmative action in the building trades beginning in 1969. These chap-
ters, along with chapter 6, on the hard hat movement, the Nixon administration, 
and affirmative action policy, contextualize how and why affirmative action was 
so quickly compromised. Activists, however, responded to this turn of events by 
using direct action and construction shutdowns in an attempt to revive and gain 
control of the implementation of affirmative action programs during the 1970s, 
as detailed in chapter 7, a study of Seattle's movement. 
Black Power at Work chronicles the profound impact that these grassroots 
movements had on national political culture and the social-movement origins of 
affirmative action politics. At their peak in the 1960s and early 1970s, these move-
ments were diverse and diffuse, spread by activists in loose communication with 
one another rather than being directed by a single organization, coalition, or gov-
ernment actor from the top down.13 At the local level, militant tactics that halted 
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work on billions of dollars of federal construction created a crisis for civil rights 
moderates and liberal-labor political coalitions. Deeming the gradualism of the 
liberal establishment to be ineffective and racist, black militants' calls for power 
and not promises created fissures in Democratic Party coalition that helped set 
in motion new forms of urban politics. "The protesters," Thomas Sugrue argues, 
"were not, in a strict sense, the architects of affirmative action. They did not draft 
executive orders and federal regulations. But, by taking their grievances to the 
streets and construction sites," they made affirmative action politically possible.14 
Yet these grassroots campaigns not only drove the creation of affirmative ac-
tion but also sought to connect the desegregation of the building trades with the 
broader Black Power movement goals of black community control and economic 
and political self-determination. The case studies in Black Power at Work locate 
the development of the Black Power construction struggles as a process begin-
ning in 1963 and extending into the early 1970s, but they strongly refute the no-
tion that Black Power contributed to the declension of the movement. Rather, the 
studies show that the community-based labor politics and grassroots organizing 
of these local Black Power movements served as the catalyst that pushed building 
trades struggles and civil rights litigation beyond their prior limitations.15 
Taken together, the chapters in Black Power at Work unsettle a number of as-
sumptions that have informed the history of civil rights, Black Power, affirmative 
action, the labor movement, and 1960s social movements. First, they remove 
affirmative action history from the world of public policy by placing its origins 
within the context of black radical and nationalist community organizing during 
the 1960s and 1970s. Second, by highlighting the community organizing strate-
gies of Black Power activists in the 1960s and early 1970s, specifically around 
the politics of employment and unionization, the studies in this book show the 
centrality of the labor question to the evolution of Black Power. The question 
of building black independent and political power, for example, was often di-
rectly connected to debates about how to best organize black workers to fight 
against economic marginalization and discrimination, both within and outside 
the "house of labor." Third, by treating affirmative action law as both labor law 
and civil rights law, the case studies provide a means for us to see Black Power 
labor activism not as antiunion—as some labor historians have derided it—but 
as an important form of labor radicalism. 
From Inclusion to Community Control 
What we now think of as affirmative action was first implemented on Public 
Works Administration (PWA) and U.S. Housing Authority (USHA) projects in 
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the 1930s and early 1940s, but it was supplanted as a remedy for employment 
discrimination when liberal activists focused on securing fair employment leg-
islation during and after World War II.16 The 1963 job-site protests, however, 
resurrected quotas or goals as a remedy for employment discrimination by using 
direct action and construction shutdowns to demand specific percentages of jobs 
in inner-city construction. These often protracted and large-scale protests drew 
violent responses from white tradesmen and police, as well as the attention of 
the federal government. Yet, although they raised awareness of discrimination in 
the building trades, these initial protests produced little in terms of tangible re-
sults. When confronted with discrimination charges, unions denied having bias 
or responsibility but pledged to police themselves, and local authorities deferred 
to the unions. Similarly, President John Kennedy's Executive Order 11114, a di-
rect response to the Philadelphia protests, called for affirmative action against 
discrimination on publicly funded projects but failed to define what this entailed 
or to provide an enforcement mechanism.17 
The liberal political machines and the federal government proved themselves 
either unwilling or unable to effectively respond to the challenge to union rac-
ism posed by African American communities. From late 1963 forward, activ-
ists in cities across the country incorporated "militant strategies and rhetoric" 
from the emerging Black Power and community control movements. Increased 
funding for inner-city construction, in the form of Lyndon Johnson's Great So-
ciety programs—first the Office of Economic Opportunity and later also Model 
Cities—contained provisions requiring the "maximum feasible participation" of 
community residents, which local activists organized to test and expand. 
The Newark Coordinating Committee (NCC), a coalition group formed in 
1963 by Newark members of CORE that had led the Barringer protests, moved 
"beyond merely exposing discrimination and demanding redress" by fighting 
to gain oversight of apprenticeship training and placement as well as commu-
nity control of local health services and urban renewal programs. The failure of 
the initial direct action campaigns and protests had a similar impact on activ-
ists elsewhere. At the national level, the unwillingness of the federal government 
to "take affirmative action" against racial discrimination in the building trades 
unions led James Farmer, CORE director, to consider sponsoring independent 
unions in 1964 to "put pressure on established unions that discriminate in ad-
mitting new members."18 CORE never established independent construction 
unions for fear of drawing the ire of the American Federation of Labor-Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and losing important financial support, 
but it did embark on a "pilot project" in Boston that created "a voluntary or-
ganization cutting across racial lines...to obtain more construction contracts 
for Negro contractors, more construction jobs for the skilled Negro worker, and 
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more apprenticeship opportunities for the unskilled Negro worker."19 In addi-
tion, in 1966 in the San Francisco Bay Area, Justice on Bay Area Rapid Transit 
(JOBART) activists staged protests to demand access to jobs on the construction 
of the regional rail system (Bay Area Rapid Transit, BART), part of a larger effort 
to "rebuild the black community in place by using development money attached 
to major projects like BART."20 
A specific trajectory within the long civil rights movement historiography re-
futes the dominant narrative that depicted Black Power and black nationalism as 
reactionary post-1965 phenomena that caused the declension of the "the good" 
civil rights movement. This scholarship rightfully revives the long ignored pre-
1960s black radical tradition, and depicts a long Black Power movement by link-
ing the Garvey movement; the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; Don't Buy 
Where You Can't Work campaigns; National Negro Congress; National Negro 
Labor Council; black internationalism; Nation of Islam; and local black nation-
alist, radical, and self-defense organizations and activists to the development of 
Black Power in the 1960s.21 
The contributors to Black Power at Work, however, make a conscious distinc-
tion between prior instances of black nationalist, community-centered, and 
black radical politics and the Black Power movement. We recognize that 1960s-
era black nationalism, as John Bracey argued nearly forty years ago, resulted 
"from a long historical development and" was "not merely a specific response 
to immediate conditions."22 Yet linking earlier movements to the Black Power 
movement often obscures the "strategic vision, goals, objectives, leaders and fol-
lowers, practices, symbols and discourses" of each movement while failing to ad-
equately address the specific historical contexts in which they were operative.23 
The movements that developed around the building trades in the 1960s shifted 
tactically and ideologically as activists experimented with and responded to local 
and national social, political, and cultural currents that were very different than 
those encountered by prior activists.24 For example, although black labor organi-
zations such as the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters may (or may not) have 
represented workplace-based Black Power in decades prior, during the 1960s 
they sought to work within the existing labor movement and its institutions and 
discouraged black independent labor organizing. 
This insider approach to racism within organized labor failed to change dis-
criminatory practices within the AFL-CIO, particularly the craft unions, thus 
providing the inspiration for calls for self-determination and independent 
unionism by the Black Power movement. In fact, the challenge posed by Black 
Power unionism was so great that civil rights unionists (including Bayard Rus-
tin, the A. Philip Randolph Institute, and the Workers Defense League) actively 
sought to shorten the Black Power movement by working in conjunction with 
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building trades unions to usurp grassroots leaders during "hometown plan" af-
firmative action negotiations.25 
Black Power and Black Mondays 
The successes and limitations of the civil rights movement and the complicity 
of liberalism in the expansion of institutionalized racism at home and abroad 
during the 1960s bolstered the growth of a Black Power movement that "thought 
globally and acted locally."26 Black workers, activists, institutions, and business-
men, frustrated with the deleterious effects of continued white economic and 
political control of urban areas—particularly in cities with rapidly expanding 
black populations—were attracted to the goals and rhetoric of community con-
trol rather than integration. But they lacked the vast resources needed to estab-
lish black economic and political self-determination in inner-city neighborhoods 
struggling with the crippling effects of deindustrialization and second ghettoiza-
tion. By seeking control over urban renewal projects, contracts, and the jobs they 
created, local Black Power activists fought to ensure that federally construction 
projects of the mid-1960s would be as politically and economically beneficial to 
inner cities and their residents as the urban renewal programs of the 1950s had 
been for white suburbanites. This approach gained increased currency as urban 
unrest and state repression escalated. 
Civil unrest and "long hot summers" had dominated U.S. urban politics from 
1963 to 1968. Inner-city "riots," most often triggered by incidents of police brutal-
ity, began in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963 and spread a year later to Harlem and 
Rochester, New York, and then to Philadelphia. Following the Watts (Los Angeles) 
uprising of 1965, hundreds of similar rebellions took place during the next three 
years in cities throughout the country. White Americans, however, including polit-
ical leaders, proved ambivalent at best about substantively addressing the rampant 
racial discrimination in housing, employment, and education, along with wide-
spread police brutality, that had enraged urban black communities. The mass up-
heavals in Detroit and Newark in 1967 were the largest, and they were followed by 
unrest around the country after the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in April 
1968. By mid-1968, these rebellions showed few signs of abating, and many if not 
most observers at the time assumed that they would persist for years to come.27 
Instead, a change took place in African American urban politics between 1968 
and 1969 that has yet to be adequately explained. Rather than persisting, the re-
bellions largely came to a halt and were replaced by well-organized grassroots po-
litical campaigns. The possibility for violence, which gave the militant demands 
made by Black Power activists attention that they otherwise would have lacked, 
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have also caused contemporaries and historians to overlook the significance of 
the local organizing traditions that Black Power advocates solidified in the wake 
of the rebellions. Instead of looting, everyday people rose up to demand jobs. 
Instead of setting fires, the poor residents of racially segregated African Ameri-
can cities across the country demanded control of the rebuilding of their com-
munities. Instead of promoting uprisings that expressed black frustration and 
powerlessness, local Black Power activists, in concert with activists across the na-
tion, organized campaigns that mobilized hundreds, and sometimes thousands, 
of people to demand control over the policies and institutions that impacted 
their lives and communities. Across the country, Black Power, already operative 
in several local construction struggles, went to work. 
These processes gained a wider expression and a more specific formulation 
when, on August 29, 1968, over 3,000 black activists met in Philadelphia to at-
tend the Third National Conference on Black Power, whose theme was "Black 
Self-Determination and Black Unity through Direct Action." An observer from 
the press described the four-day event, with its roughly fifty different plenary and 
workshop sessions, as being different in tone from the "loud rhetoric" and blus-
ter that defined the Black Power conference held in Newark the previous year. 
With the meanings of Black Power already theorized and the need for implemen-
tation and organization clear, conference attendees in Philadelphia participated 
in "intense and serious discussion... [about] programs of action in which blacks 
at all levels—both moderates and militants—can become involved." Seizing con-
trol of the political, economic, and social institutions whose everyday operation 
allowed white people to exercise control over black urban communities, activists 
believed, would harness the rise in black militancy that followed the outbreak of 
the urban rebellions in a common struggle to end "internal colonization" and 
establish black self-determination and "community control."28 
Formulating an economic program for Black Power played a significant role 
in shaping how conference attendees framed what Black Power and community 
control entailed. Conference attendees linked the call for jobs with the call for 
political power and the development of black businesses and job opportunities 
with larger demands for power beginning at the local neighborhood level. Fed-
eral government funding of urban renewal projects and the reconstruction of 
postrebellion inner cities through the Model Cities Program deeply implicated 
the U.S. government in the razing of African American communities in the name 
of social progress. Conference attendees attacked existing "federally funded in-
stitutional expansions, highway development and urban renewal" as coordinated 
attempts to fragment and weaken black communities, institutions, and voting 
power as the concentration of black citizens in urban areas expanded.29 Activists 
rejected these federal projects as a form of "colonization," a "neo-plantationism" 
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created by "the systematic effort of racist planners and politicians to isolate, con-
fuse and destroy Black people socially, economically, mentally and spiritually."30 
But Black Power activists also saw organizing potential in federal rede-
velopment projects. Community control groups, if effectively organized at the 
grassroots level, could demand that every aspect of such projects—from policy 
making to labor—be placed under black control. To work toward this objec-
tive, activists dedicated themselves to taking control of or blocking Model Cit-
ies programs at the local level while also developing "trade training institutions, 
programs and unions" on a nationwide basis to create a material foundation for 
community economic development and self-determination.31 This call for ac-
tion, and the subsequent movement building that took place across the country, 
set the stage for a looming confrontation among Black Power activists, racially 
exclusive skilled trades unions, and the U.S. government. 
From July to September 1969, Black Power activists around the country or-
ganized a wave of direct action protests against employment discrimination in 
the U.S. construction industry. Demanding the immediate implementation of 
affirmative action programs to fund black contractors and hire and train black 
(and sometimes also Puerto Rican) workers on federally funded construction 
projects in inner-city neighborhoods, protesters shut down billions of dollars of 
government projects in many of the largest U.S. cities. Beginning in Chicago and 
Pittsburgh in July, spreading to Philadelphia in August, and inspiring similar ac-
tions throughout the urban North from Seattle to New York City in September to 
coincide with Black Monday protests called by activists in Pittsburgh, this wave 
of direct action campaigns was directly responsible for the breakthrough of af-
firmative action at the federal level.32 
What little has been written about the wave of construction-site closures in 
1969 tends to describe them as both riots and protests, as an extension of the 
"long hot summers" and a transformation of them, even though actual violence 
was rare and burning and looting were nonexistent.33 Black Power activists in-
tentionally mobilized protests to capitalize on white people's fears of racial vio-
lence in the wake of urban rebellions. In cities such as Detroit and Washington, 
D.C., the scale of the previous rebellions and fear of continued racial unrest were 
so great that the mere threat of protest was sufficient to provide activists with 
leverage to demand community control of, and federal intervention in, pending 
inner-city redevelopment projects. 
Black Power at Work 
Histories of affirmative action written since the early 1990s have documented 
how the political crisis that protesters created made the Philadelphia Plan—the 
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first affirmative action plan ever imposed by the federal government—politically 
possible. The imposition by the U.S. Labor Department of the Philadelphia Plan, 
which imposed goals and timetables for the hiring of black construction workers 
on federal contractors in Philadelphia, opened the door for similar affirmative 
action plans in other cities as both riot prevention and a civil rights policy alter-
native to the War on Poverty.34 At the same time, officials in the Richard Nixon 
White House hoped to flood the construction industry with low-wage nonunion 
labor as a means of controlling the contribution of high construction indus-
try wages to inflation.35 But regardless of Nixon's goals, the tactic he introduced 
proved uncontrollable. In conjunction with the increasingly expansive interpre-
tation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by the federal courts, the Philadelphia 
Plan moved the metric for discrimination from individual acts of discrimination 
to workplace diversity statistics and shifted the object of reform in fair employ-
ment law from individual actions to institutionalized patterns and practices of 
racial discrimination. 
Yet, despite the significance of the 1969 protests to this change in federal pol-
icy, most histories have taken these movements out of affirmative action history. 
Intellectual and policy studies of affirmative action invoke civil rights campaigns 
(if at all) mainly to describe them as a pretext for action by the Nixon White 
House. They largely omit what preceded or followed the Black Monday protests 
as if the movements had no role in the subsequent development or enforcement 
of affirmative action.36 Similarly, the voluminous histories of civil rights, Black 
Power, and 1960s social movements of the last forty years have almost totally 
ignored the Black Monday protests. 
Perhaps one reason why these protests have been overlooked by historians is 
that telling their history requires rethinking the declension narratives of the civil 
rights movement and African American urban politics that have structured so 
many histories of the late 1960s and 1970s. By demanding jobs and not welfare, 
power and not proclamations of equal opportunity, Black Monday protest lead-
ers cut against the stereotypes of hopelessness, passivity, criminality, and a "cul-
ture of poverty" that have dominated popular discussions of African American 
ghettos and the development of the so-called underclass during the post-civil 
rights era.37 Instead of being the passive victims of capital flight (urban dein-
dustrialization) and white flight (urban depopulation), the participants in these 
campaigns imagined a new direction and purpose for both inner cities and the 
black freedom movement. The Black Monday protest leaders were local activ-
ists, not national media icons. Their organizations were so new that they seemed 
almost ad hoc, and they blended community and labor politics in a way that 
often blurred the boundaries among civil rights organizations, black national-
ist organizations, independent labor unions, and social service agencies. They 
were led by a combination of black youth (often involved in War on Poverty job 
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training programs), community activists, and black construction workers and 
contractors who do not fit neatly into the standard organizational genealogies 
of the civil rights, Black Power, and the labor movement. Their mobilizations 
gave everyday people the means to put forward their own vision to confront 
institutionalized racism and the so-called urban crisis. Affirmative action in the 
construction industry had been a goal of the black freedom struggle since 1963, 
but the Black Monday protests produced what six years of prior protests and 
shutdowns had paved the way for but failed to secure. 
By linking the development of alternatives to the urban crisis to the engage-
ment by the Black Power movement with labor movement politics, the case 
studies in Black Power at Work contribute to the emerging field of Black Power 
studies. Recent works in this field have highlighted the relationship of the Black 
Power movement to prior struggles and its varied meanings and manifestations 
among community organizers and theorists, black feminists, cultural national-
ists, student organizers, and clergy, as well as its influence on the development 
of "rainbow radicalism."38 These works have begun shifting attention away from 
a prior focus on familiar national figures, singular activists and organizations, 
and titillating tales of violence and declension. Yet more still needs to be done 
to describe Black Power's labor politics and the impact that the campaigns for 
jobs had on the history and development of the movement locally and nation-
ally. With the exception of school decentralization campaigns, the movements 
for community control of the construction industry secured more mass support 
than most of the better-known and more iconic campaigns of the Black Power 
movement. The chapters in this book provide a starting point for documenting 
this history as part of the broader project of connecting it to the robust and com-
plicated Black Power community-organizing tradition.39 
Peter Levy locates the origins of Black Power labor politics in deindustrializa-
tion and the limits of liberalism, arguing that industrial "social activist unions, 
which had stood at the front of the fight for civil rights and economic reform, 
bore the brunt of the Black Power critique because they were the unions that 
were most susceptible to the structural changes taking place." The construction 
unions, which "had the worst records on civil rights," were in Levy's estima-
tion "less affected by structural changes and thus escaped part of Black Power's 
wrath."40 But the Black Monday protesters' use of direct action at the point of 
production and their focus on community control of inner-city construction 
directly challenge such narrowly focused definitions of Black Power and Black 
Power unionism. And, although Black Power unionism did not replace civil 
rights unionism or end the long civil rights movement, even these movements 
and the shifting historical contexts in which they operated cannot be under-
stood without first acknowledging the ways in which Black Power rhetoric and 
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organizational activities influenced black workers both within and outside the 
"house of labor."41 
The Chapters 
Black struggles for inclusion in the northern building trades unions and the con-
struction industry began long before the rise of direct action protests during the 
1960s. During the first half of twentieth century, black tradesmen in the North 
and West were restricted from working in all but the low-skill "trowel trades" and 
were forced into segregated locals that lacked power on the job and lacked influ-
ence within their respective unions. When individual attempts to join unions 
proved fruitless, as Erik S. Gellman (chap. 5 in this volume) discusses, some black 
tradesmen formed independent worker associations that served as parallel labor 
organizations, not unlike those found among black craftsmen in other segre-
gated industries in the early twentieth century. Or, as John J. Rosen (chap. 3) and 
David Goldberg (chap. 4) document, black tradesmen sought greater control 
over their work through state or local licensing to become independent con-
struction contractors.42 
White contractors and the unions, through labor and contractor federations, 
generally colluded at the local level to refuse to admit black workers to skilled 
trades and to marginalize their voluntary worker and contractor organizations. 
At the national level, in 1935 the AFL, in which the building trades unions had 
long played an essential part, threatened to withdraw its support for the Wag-
ner Act (which legalized union organizing for the first time) if an amendment 
that made racial discrimination an unfair labor practice was not removed from 
the bill. With no explicit prohibition of union racism, and with the exclusion of 
domestic and farm laborers (nearly two-thirds of all black workers at the time) 
from union rights, the Wagner Act became "the Magna Carta for white labor."43 
Practices of racial discrimination in the building trades thus remained firmly 
intact despite the establishment of racial quotas on PWA and federally funded 
public housing projects. Subsequent fair employment campaigns led by local 
chapters of the National Negro Congress, National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP), and Urban League during the 1930s and 1940 
had little impact.44 As a result, black tradesmen largely remained restricted to 
working with small black contractors on piecemeal, short-term jobs in black 
communities. Well into the post-World War II era, the racial exclusivity of the 
building trades unions, much like the skilled trades in the railroad and print-
ing industries, remained stark. An Urban League survey of plumbers unions, 
for example, found no black journeymen in twenty of the twenty-three cities 
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it surveyed. Bricklayers, although mildly better outside the South, had twenty-
five formally segregated southern locals in 1962. In New York City, a number of 
trades had "for white only" and "father-son only" apprenticeship clauses, and 
many others followed this practice in deed rather than words.45 
In 1956, following the merger of the AFL and CIO, NAACP Labor Secre-
tary Herbert Hill found little support for the proposals he frequently offered to 
eliminate racial discrimination in the building trades unions.46 HilPs appeals to 
the international building trades unions were continually rebuked, and George 
Meany, AFL-CIO president, regularly "defended the practices of the building 
trades councils." This included the defense by Meany and the AFL-CIO Civil 
Rights Committee of Milwaukee Bricklayers Local 8 even after local courts ruled 
that the union was in violation state antidiscrimination laws. The AFL-CIO also 
refused to intervene when presented with evidence that East St. Louis Plumbers 
Union Local 630 had completely barred blacks from membership. Meany did 
help three black youths in Cleveland gain entrance to an apprenticeship program 
for the electricians union in 1957 by threatening to decertify the union, but this 
was a rare exception that proved the rule. Ten years later, for example, the 1,200-
member local still had only two black journeymen and two black apprentices.47 
Even Walter Reuther, the president of the United Auto Workers (UAW) and 
prominent supporter of the southern civil rights movement, "failed to lift a finger 
during AFL-CIO council meetings" on building trades union discrimination.48 
"By the end of 1959," Gilbert Jonas explains, "the NAACP and Labor Sec-
retary Hill had abandoned hope that racial justice in the workplace could be 
accomplished under the leadership of white labor leaders."49 During the early 
1960s, Hill stepped up his efforts to expose the racism of the building trades 
unions in speeches and widely publicized studies. But, rather than appealing to 
the conscience of the AFL-CIO, Hill began promoting aggressive litigation and 
grassroots organizing in local NAACP branches.50 
In 1963, CORE, the most militant of the civil rights organizations in the North 
in the early 1960s, accelerated the work of Hill and the NAACP. CORE chapters 
were important pioneers in using direct action to challenge racism in the con-
struction industry, sparking the initial protests in Philadelphia and participat-
ing in the movements that followed.51 Inspired by CORE and NAACP protests 
in Philadelphia and New York City, Brooklyn CORE, with the help of a local 
black ministerial alliance, halted construction on the Downstate Medical Center 
in summer 1963. This campaign, as Brian Purnell (chap. 1 in this volume) ar-
gues, represented an unstable fusion of civil rights and Black Power perspectives 
and tactics. The Downstate Medical Center protests, although failing to secure 
jobs for local residents, pushed CORE and other movement participants in a 
variety of different directions in the years that followed. Brooklyn CORE, for 
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example, went from being half white in summer 1963 to being predominantly 
black, working class, and more radical and community-centered as a result of 
the Downstate campaign. At the individual level, Sonny Carson, Brooklyn CORE 
member and Downstate activist, went on to become a major force in the com-
munity control and Black Power movements, later serving as the chairman of 
the economics workshop at the Third National Conference on Black Power in 
Philadelphia in 1968.52 
The history of CORE and the Newark Coordinating Committee (NCC) simi-
larly helps us see the gradual development of Black Power and its intersections 
with the civil rights movement prior to the late 1960s.53 CORE members' involve-
ment in building trades protests in New Jersey moved younger militant activists 
from the margins to the center of the Newark freedom movement. As Julia Rabig 
(chap. 2 in this volume) shows, the formation of the NCC challenged the gradual-
ist, integrationist approach to civil rights taken previously by the Newark demo-
cratic machine, established civil rights leaders, and the business elite. What is more, 
their protests at the construction of Barringer High School in 1963 set off a series 
of changes within the Newark freedom movement so that calls for affirmative ac-
tion became connected to calls for community control. These demands were ad-
vanced by the development of autonomous and parallel institutions, ideological 
and tactical approaches that expanded following the 1967 Newark rebellion. 
The increasing significance of community control and Black Power politics 
in construction struggles resulted largely from the failure of previous efforts of 
blacks to gain inclusion in the trades. Government officials generally approached 
the topic of discrimination in the building trades unions by deferring to union 
supporters. Although the Department of Labor authorized the Bureau of Ap-
prenticeship Training (BAT) to decertify discriminatory programs in 1963, BAT, 
headed by a former official of the New York Bricklayers' Union, refused to do so. 
This approach produced token results while maintaining union control of access, 
training, placement, and jobs.54 
Between 1963 and 1968, "protests and policy innovations reinforced each 
other in a feedback loop"55 that eventually took the enforcement of civil rights 
law to uncharted territory. Herbert Hill, of the NAACP, provided the public face 
for the diffuse movements in the urban North, leading protests that called for 
strengthened federal policy while also fighting for the rigorous enforcement of 
existing mandates. Hill pushed for litigation against building trades unions, craft-
ing some of the very first lawsuits seeking to enforce Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act.56 He also helped organize and publicize a wave of 1965 protests.57 
And while continuing to provide information, organizational support, and re-
sources to civil rights activists around the country, by the late 1960s, Hill had 
helped foster the development of independent black worker unions and black 
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contractor associations in an attempt to bypass the building trades unions and to 
make workers' calls for community control of construction a reality.58 
Efforts to desegregate the building trades generally attracted the guarded at-
tention of policymakers—but only after construction protests were joined by 
large-scale civil disorders and rising black militancy. Job site and union hall shut-
downs occurred in St. Louis, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Newark, and the Bronx in 
1964 and summer 1965, but the federal government did not intercede.59 But on 
August 11,1965, when rebellion broke out in the Watts neighborhood of Los An-
geles, national political discourse finally began to debate the consequences (and, 
less often, the causes) of African Americans being forced to live in highly segre-
gated and impoverished neighborhoods located in the center of the wealthiest 
U.S. metropolitan regions. Roughly six weeks later, President Johnson intervened 
by issuing Executive Order 11246, which reaffirmed Kennedy's prior order and 
created the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) to enforce it. 
The OFCC, located within the U.S. Department of Labor, had substantially 
more power than the free-floating and underfunded agency created to enforce 
Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). It was 
granted the power to cancel contracts with contractors who had failed to take af-
firmative action against discrimination when subcontracting labor, but it refused 
to enforce this provision. Instead, it began crafting plans "to enforce compliance 
on construction contracts" for St. Louis and San Francisco in 1966 and for Cleve-
land and Philadelphia in 1967.60 
By targeting cities that were already hotbeds for construction protests and 
Black Power organizing, the OFCC programs ended up contributing further 
to Black Power organizing. These plans expanded the ineffectual model created 
by BAT, giving credence to radicals' demands for community control. OFCC 
programs were funded by the Labor Department's Manpower Administration 
and were overseen in collaboration with the building trades unions and moder-
ate black organizations such the Urban League, Workers Defense League, Trade 
Union Leadership Council, and Opportunities Industrialization Centers. They 
focused on increasing the pool of minority applicants to apprenticeship pro-
grams, but had little effect on the placement of minority workers in jobs or their 
admission into unions. 
Federally imposed remedies were slow in developing and strongly resisted by 
both the building trades unions and segments of the government.61 The building 
trades unions responded to the implementation of the St. Louis Plan by walk-
ing off the Gateway Arch construction site, provoking a protracted legal dispute. 
The Cleveland and Philadelphia plans crafted a year later—the former was later 
"recommended to the Kerner Commission"62 as a means of combating unem-
ployment and rioting and served as a model for the latter—were stronger. Both 
